Russia is concerned about the challenges in the Caucasus TOU

Russia is concerned about the challenges in the Caucasus

 TOU

Russia is concerned about the challenges in the Caucasus

The first two weeks of 2022 have been eventful and result-oriented for Russia and its neighbors. Last week, Russia sent troops to Kazakhstan through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in response to widespread unrest, while Russian officials this week engaged in a series of high-stakes talks with US and NATO officials. Ukraine. However, there is another region that has been overlooked but it could prove to be just as dynamic in the coming weeks and months: the Caucasus.

Already, the military has grown Hostility In recent days, on their shared border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, more than a year after the end of large-scale fighting between the two, as the ambassadors of Armenia and Turkey held their first round. Talk On political generalization in Moscow on January 14. Both developments can be seen as the result of a brief war that erupted on the disputed territory. Nagorno-Karabakh In late 2020, a conflict led to the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in the region and a redesign of the region’s political and security landscape. In turn, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has served as a strategic backdrop and important precursor to the events currently unfolding in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

There may be various reasons and motives for the Russian military deployment in the post-Soviet space, but at the root of each is a very direct objective for Moscow: to strengthen its influence as an influential external force in the region and to prevent or limit the influence of others. External forces. For example, in the case of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine 2014, It was intended to limit the influence of the West, including the European Union and especially NATO, in the wake of the pro-Western revolution in Kiev. The same was true for Russian intervention in Georgia 2008, Coming just months after the bloc recognized aspirations for Georgian and Ukrainian membership at the Bucharest Summit.

             </div><div>
                    <p>The first two weeks of 2022 have been eventful and result-oriented for Russia and its neighbors.  Last week, Russia sent troops to Kazakhstan through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in response to widespread unrest, while Russian officials this week engaged in a series of high-stakes talks with US and NATO officials. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-set-out-security-demands-nato-meeting-2022-01-12/">Ukraine</a>.  However, there is another region that has been overlooked but it could prove to be just as dynamic in the coming weeks and months: the Caucasus.

Already, the military has grown Hostility In recent days, on their shared border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, more than a year after the end of large-scale fighting between the two, as the ambassadors of Armenia and Turkey held their first round. Talk On political generalization in Moscow on January 14. Both developments can be seen as the result of a brief war that erupted on the disputed territory. Nagorno-Karabakh In late 2020, a conflict led to the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in the region and a redesign of the region’s political and security landscape. In turn, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has served as a strategic backdrop and important precursor to the events currently unfolding in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

There may be various reasons and motives for the Russian military deployment in the post-Soviet space, but at the root of each is a very direct objective for Moscow: to strengthen its influence as an influential external force in the region and to prevent or limit the influence of others. External forces. For example, in the case of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine 2014, It was intended to limit the influence of the West, including the European Union and especially NATO, in the wake of the pro-Western revolution in Kiev. The same was true for Russian intervention in Georgia 2008, Coming just months after the bloc recognized aspirations for Georgian and Ukrainian membership at the Bucharest Summit.

Moscow’s intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020 was aimed at preventing regional damage at the hands of Azerbaijan by Russia’s ally and ally CSTO member Armenia, which was more independent and not an institutional ally. But the manner and timing of Russia’s intervention also have elements of self-interest, enabling Moscow to maintain relations with both Baku and Yerevan.

Going forward also meant limiting the influence of Turkey, which has security support for Azerbaijan, including its weapons. TB2 drone The country’s forces proved crucial in helping break up the Armenian defense. Thus, Russia intervened as a mediator to oversee the ceasefire and oversee the transfer of territory to Nagorno-Karabakh and from Armenia to Azerbaijan, which was painful for Yerevan to accept, but at the same time far less than what Armenian forces would otherwise be. Probably lost on the battlefield. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to a Moscow-brokered ceasefire, the implementation of which included the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers in November 2020.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict highlighted Russia’s position in regional power and its continued ability to shape events in Moscow, but also revealed that Moscow’s influence was limited. After all, Russia’s preferred outcome would be the status quo before the war, but Azerbaijan, with its own allies in Turkey, was able to forcefully challenge this status quo. This challenge significantly increased Ankara’s profile in the region, with Moscow agreeing to joint Russian-Turkish monitoring. Center Russia has no choice but to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire and accept the important regional power role played by Turkey.

The year since then has also revealed major obstacles to Russia’s influence in the region. Despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, both Armenian and Azerbaijani forces Violated Occasional and sometimes fatal ceasefires. And Turkey is able to take advantage of its growing influence for its own political and economic benefits, especially in its support for Azerbaijan’s regional transport and infrastructure. Initiative And his diplomacy Outreach In Armenia to resume trade and flights and revive the long dormant process of political normalization.

To be sure, Russia has played a key role in all these discussions, but Moscow is no longer the only major actor in shaping the geopolitics of the Caucasus. While Russia’s military presence in the region has eased tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is not enough to stem the tide of violence or bring lasting peace. Turkey, meanwhile, has demonstrated its willingness and ability to directly challenge Russia in this area, although both countries cooperate in other areas, such as energy and arms sales. The world is becoming more and more polarized, which could serve as both an advantage and a challenge for the powers that be, including Moscow.

This brings us back to the events unfolding in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In the case of Ukraine, Russia is still trying to push back against the political, economic and security influence of the West, while seeking assurances against the prospects of NATO expansion which it has fought to avoid. In Kazakhstan, Russia is less concerned about the West, but it can see its position as a dominant external power giving way to others, including China and perhaps Turkey. While Russia has established a pragmatic division of labor with China in Central Asia, Moscow cannot guarantee that this working system will last forever. And Russia may be less convinced about Turkey’s intentions, given that both are on the opposite side of the conflict in areas such as Syria and Libya, and that Turkish TB2 drones are now being sold to select people. Ukraine And Kyrgyzstan.

Thus, there is a broad connection between what is happening in the Caucasus and what is happening in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The Kremlin appears to be being challenged from a number of directions by its dominant position in the former Soviet perimeter, and Russia’s deployment of the CSTO in Kazakhstan and its military maneuvers on the Ukrainian border are intended to show that Moscow is ready to use military force to maintain it. Status as a dominant regional power in post-Soviet space.

However, such military action can only take Russia, and they are in danger of being hit. Russia, for example, has to take into account that its CSTO deployment in Kazakhstan could set a dangerous precedent, as other member states such as Armenia are not collectively unfamiliar. Protest And unrest. For example, if violent demonstrations erupt in Armenia in the future, will Russia intervene again? And if so, can it be certain that such an intervention would be successful? Such questions may become increasingly relevant as Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to look down on each other and Turkey and others look to expand their position in the region. The Caucasus may soon prove less dynamic and result-oriented than Eastern Europe or Central Asia, both for Russia and for the powers that be.

if you want to read this article from the original credit source of the article then you can read from here

.